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Abstract
As the popularity of iris recognition systems increases,
the importance of effective security measures against pre-
sentation attacks becomes paramount. This work presents
an overview of the most important advances in the area of
iris presentation attack detection published in recent two
years. Newly-released, publicly-available datasets for de-
velopment and evaluation of iris presentation attack detec-
tion are discussed. Recent literature can be seen to be bro-
ken into three categories: traditional “hand-crafted” feature
extraction and classification, deep learning-based solutions,
and hybrid approaches fusing both methodologies. Conclu-
sions of modern approaches underscore the difficulty of this
task. Finally, commentary on possible directions for future
research is provided.
1 Introduction
Iris recognition has gained a place as one of the fastest
and most secure biometric authentication methods. It has
proven effective in many large-scale applications such as
national identification ([35]) and border control ([25]). With
the increased deployment, the security of these recognition
systems against attacks becomes critical. The most com-
mon form of security breach is presentation attacks. This
term refers to a sample being presented to an iris sensor
with the goal of manipulating the biometric matching into
an incorrect decision.
Presentation attack samples can be used to either im-
personate an identity or to conceal an identity. Impostor
Attack Presentation is the term used for impersonation at-
tacks, while Concealer Attack Presentation describes an at-
tack meant to hide the user’s identity. Users can also attempt
to register a presentation attack sample in the system such
that it makes it easy to continually manipulate the system.
Researchers must develop systems that are robust to
some or all of the aforementioned attacks. The area of
* indicates equal contribution
research is Presentation Attack Detection (PAD). An ideal
PAD system can determine whether any sample that is pre-
sented to a sensor is from a bona fide iris or is a presen-
tation attack. This goal is difficult to achieve due to the
ever-changing attack landscape. As systems become more
resilient to known attack types, new attacks are being for-
mulated and deployed. This survey reviews studies relat-
ing to both closed-set recognition, where the testing attack
types are known during training, and open-set recognition,
where the testing attack types are unknown during training.
Solutions to iris PAD can be either software-based and
hardware-based. Software-based solutions use only the in-
formation present in the image to make the classification,
whereas hardware solutions employ additional illumination
or sensors to aid the classification. This survey discusses
mainly software-based solutions, however, some recent ad-
vances in hardware solutions are also discussed.
This work builds upon a comprehensive iris PAD survey
by [6] to summarize the most important developments in the
field since June 2018.
2 Terminology and Attack Instrumentation
In [6], as an initiative toward more consistent terminol-
ogy, the authors followed the vocabulary recommended in
ISO/IEC 30107-3:2017. Here, we follow the same practice
and provide a review of this terminology.
2.1 Presentation Attack Instruments
A presentation to a biometric sensor is either a bona fide
presentation or an attack presentation. Presentation attack
instruments (PAI) are those biometric characteristics or ar-
tificial objects used in presentation attacks.
Impostor Attack Presentation Impostor attacks are typ-
ically generated from bona fide images of an iris. For ex-
ample, attackers may have acquired the iris image of an
individual with access to a system and wish to be granted
access. One common impostor attack instrument is paper
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(a) Bona fide Irises
(b) Textured Contact
Lenses (c) Paper Printouts (d) Post-mortem Samples (e) Synthetic Irises
Figure 1: This figure shows some of the common presentation attack instruments from publicly available datasets.
printouts of iris images, shown in Figure 1c. Another im-
postor attack method is a replay attack, where bona fide iris
images displayed on a screen are presented to the sensor. In
general, formulating a successful Impostor Attack is more
difficult than a concealer attack because you need the recog-
nition software to determine you are a known individual,
rather than the latter which requires the system to determine
you are not a known individual.
Concealer Attack Presentation The most common Con-
cealer Attack Presentation instrument is textured contact
lenses. The texture on these lenses obscures substantial por-
tions of the iris, preventing the iris recognition system from
identifying the user. There are also contact lenses that are
colored to alter the user’s eye color appearance. Due to the
wide range of manufacturers, all with unique designs, pat-
terns and colors, these concealer attacks can be hard to dis-
tinguish from bona fide irises. In addition, the lenses may
shift around on the eye such that different image captures of
the same eye wearing the same textured contact may vary.
Examples of different brands of textured contact lenses can
be seen in Figure 1b. The goal of this attack is simply to en-
sure anonymity of the user. It is also possible that attackers
could use these textured contact lenses as an Impostor At-
tack, where a genuine iris texture is transcribed onto a lens.
However, to our knowledge, this type of impostor attack has
not yet been successfully demonstrated.
Another possible concealer attack is synthetic iris im-
ages that can imitate a bona fide iris pattern. Synthetic
samples pose a problem to PAD systems, as even humans
may have difficulty to distinguish between a (good) syn-
thetic sample and a genuine iris. Examples of two differ-
ent types of synthetic iris images are shown in Figure 1e.
The top example shows generation of synthetic iris texture
by combining bona fide iris texture patches to form a new
iris texture. The second shows examples of synthetic irises
generated by a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) by
[41]. Synthetic iris images such as those found in CASIA-
Iris-Synthetic ([4]) and the work by [41, 40] can prove to
be useful in training PAD systems to become more robust
to unseen attacks. However, as these are generated images,
the problem of how to present these samples to a sensor still
exists. Thus, although synthetic irises can deceive software
solutions, it is challenging to present this attack type to a
sensor without having to use an aforementioned impostor
attack such as printouts or a replay attack. Especially as,
or if, remote iris authentication becomes more widespread,
synthetic presentation attacks will become viable and de-
mand more attention.
As shown in [32], the irises of deceased individuals can
also be used as a presentation attack instrument. For some
number of hours post-mortem, the texture of the iris remains
intact enough to deceive an iris PAD system. Hypotheti-
cally, the post-mortem iris could be used as an impostor at-
tack of the deceased individual. However, more realistic is
that someone may use an image of a post-mortem sample to
hide their identity. Post-mortem iris samples closely resem-
ble live irises in the early stages after death. Thus, detecting
these samples in the wild may prove difficult. The top image
in Figure 1d is an early-stage post-mortem sample whereas
the bottom sample represents a later-stage capture.
2.2 Error Rates
Basic PAD-related error metrics include: Attack Pre-
sentation Classification Error Rate (APCER), which
refers to the proportion of attack presentations incorrectly
classified as bona fide presentations; Bona Fide Presenta-
tion Classification Error Rate (BPCER), which refers to
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the proportion of bona fide presentations incorrectly clas-
sified as presentation attacks; Imposter Attack Presenta-
tion Match Rate (IAPMR), which refers to the proportion
of impostor attack presentations that are successful, where
the biometric reference for the targeted identity is matched
(IAPMR is analogous to the false match rate (FMR) in
identity verification); and Concealer Attack Presentation
Non-Match Rate (CAPNMR), which refers to the pro-
portion of concealer attack presentations that are success-
ful, where the biometric reference of the concealer is not
matched (CAPNMR is analogous to the false non-match
rate (FNMR) in identity verification).
2.3 Acronyms
Similar to [6], we summarize the meanings of several
acronyms, used throughout the article: BSIF: Binary Sta-
tistical Image Features, [17], CNN: Convolutional Neural
Network, [22], HoG: Histogram of oriented Gradients, [8],
LBP: Local Binary Patterns, [28], SID: Shift-Invariant De-
scriptor, [20], SVM: Support Vector Machine, [2].
3 Databases To Support Iris PAD Research
In this paper, we focus on the publicly-available datasets
that emerged after the survey by [6]. We do not include pro-
prietary datasets. In [6], the authors also offered a review of
the iris PAD competitions, which included the LivDet-Iris
series in [43, 44, 42], as well as the MoblLive competition
in [30]. No new competitions have been conducted since
then.
Since 2018, seven new iris PAD datasets have been of-
fered. From the perspective of PAIs, three include textured
contact lenses, two include post-mortem irises, and one in-
cludes prosthetic eyes. To provide a clearer and more direct
comparison between datasets, we summarize the most im-
portant technical properties of the datasets in Tables 1 and
2.
There are several observations worth noting here. First,
six out of seven newly collected datasets are static sam-
ples and only one database by [18] offers videos demon-
strating iris/pupil dynamics (but only live samples are in-
cluded, without any spoof examples). This shows that static
samples are still the most ubiquitous type of data used in
iris PAD. Second, no images of irises printed out on paper
and presented to the sensor are included in any of the new
datasets, while in [6], the most popular attack instrument
in the datasets is iris printouts. Apparently, the current re-
search focus has shifted from printouts to more challeng-
ing presentation attack instruments such as contact lens and
postmortem irises. Third, [39] introduced images collected
in both indoor (controlled) and outdoor (unconstrained) en-
vironment. The inclusion of images captured in uncon-
strained environments facilitates research for more robust
algorithms that can be deployed on mobile devices.
4 Latest Proposed PAD Methodologies
4.1 Traditional Computer Vision-Based Methods
Since 2018, most iris PAD research has shifted toward
deep learning methods, but a few traditional computer
vision-based methods has also been proposed. [24] devel-
oped an open source PAD method (OSPAD-2D) based on
2D iris texture features for detecting textured contact lens,
available in both C++ and Python. The method is an open
source extension of [10]. Multi-scale BSIF is used as the
feature extractor and an ensemble of multiple classifiers in-
cluding SVM, Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), and Random
Forests (RF) is trained on top to make the prediction. This
method obtains an accuracy on LivDet-Iris 2017 on par
with that of the LivDet-Iris 2017 winner. Furthermore, the
method does not use any iris segmentation but uses a best
guess (a box centered in the image) instead, leveraging the
fact that commercial iris sensors have the iris located near
the center of the image. If an open-source segmentation
software were included, the overall method should achieve
better performance while remaining open-source.
[36] designed a multi-spectral iris sensor with five fre-
quency bands (800nm, 830nm, 850nm, 870nm, 980nm) to
perform iris recognition and PAD. Several classes of feature
extractors are used: texture-based (LBP and GLCM), im-
age quality-based (BRISQUE), and spectral variation-based
(spectral signature). Features across all descriptors and all
wavelengths are fused using a weighted sum rule to perform
the final classification. Since the main contribution of this
paper is to propose a new sensor, data was collected specif-
ically using the new sensor. The LBP-SVM achieves the
best performance with 0% BPCER and 5% APCER.
[7] proposed a photometric stereo-based 3D PAD
method (OSPAD-3D). The method builds on the fact that
when a bona fide iris is illuminated from opposite direc-
tions, the shadows observed in two images are minimal.
However, for an iris wearing textured contact lens, signif-
icant differences in the shadows are observed in the im-
ages. Therefore, the reconstructed surface is relatively flat
for bona fide irises but more irregular for irises with textured
contact lens. Given a pair of masked iris images, OSPAD-
3D estimates the surface normal vectors of the iris surface
from photometric stereo, and the variance of the vectors’
distances to the mean normal vector is computed as the PAD
score.
[37] detect contact lenses by observing the change in
Gaussian curvature of the outer cornea surface caused by
wearing contact lenses. For a bona fide iris, the Gaus-
sian curvature of each point on the cornea is basically un-
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Table 1: Technical properties of datasets used in development of iris PAD methods.
Benchmark name Type Wavelength Sensor(s) Spatial or temporal
[paper] of samples range used resolution
ND WACV 2019, [7] CL NIR L4 640× 480 px
ND Iris3D, [12] CL NIR A, L4 640× 480 px
Warsaw-BioBase-Postmortem-Iris-v2, [33] PM NIR IS 640× 480 px
VIS TG3 640× 480 px
Warsaw-BioBase-Postmortem-Iris-v3, [34] PM NIR IS 640× 480 px
VIS TG3 640× 480 px
Warsaw-BioBase-Pupil-Dynamics v3.0, [18] PD NIR SD 768× 576 px / 25 Hz
WVU Un-MIPA, [39] CL NIR BK,E,IS 640× 480 px
[36] PE NIR SD 2448× 2048 px
Type of samples: CL - live + textured contact lenses; PE - live + prosthetic eyes; PM - post-mortem (cadaver) iris; PD - iris videos
with pupil reaction to light stimuli. Wavelength: NIR - near-infrared; VIS - visible light. Sensors: A - IrisGuard AD 100;
BK - IrisShield BK 2121U; E CMITECH EMX-30; IS IriShield MK2120U; L4 LG4000; TG3 Olympus TG-3; SD Self-designed.
Table 2: Subject breakdown information of datasets used in development of iris PAD methods.
Benchmark name # Distinct irises # Samples Train/test
[paper] BF PA BF PA Total split
ND WACV 2019, [7] 238 74 1,404 2,664 4,068 yes
ND Iris3D, [12] 176 176 3,458 3,392 6,850 yes
Warsaw-BioBase-Postmortem-Iris-v2 (NIR), [33] 0 73 0 1,200 1,200 no
Warsaw-BioBase-Postmortem-Iris-v2 (VIS), [33] 0 73 0 1,787 1,787 no
Warsaw-BioBase-Postmortem-Iris-v3 (NIR), [34] 0 42 0 1,094 1,094 no
Warsaw-BioBase-Postmortem-Iris-v3 (VIS), [34] 0 42 0 785 785 no
Warsaw-BioBase-Pupil-Dynamics v3.0, [18] 84 0 117,117 0 117,117 no
WVU Un-MIPA, [39] 162 162 9,319 9,387 18,706 no
[36] 24 2 1,200 2,400 3,600 yes
BF = Bona Fide Samples, PA = Presentation Attack Samples
changed, as it is a stable and detectable intrinsic property.
After contact lenses are put on, however, the Gaussian cur-
vature of the outer cornea surface changes from a sphere to
an ellipsoid, with the curvature large at the center and small
at the margins. This method, unfortunately, is tested on a
self-collected dataset. Although the authors report a 0% er-
ror rate, no comparisons with other methods can be made.
Based on methods in [24] and [7], [12] proposed an algo-
rithm that fuses the 2D textural features and 3D photomet-
ric stereo features (OSPAD-fusion). The authors identified
that OSPAD-3D often fails to detect attack presentations
of highly opaque contact lens, as they produce very little
shadow, and OSPAD-2D often achieves a high APCER and
low BPCER on unknown samples, so the samples marked
as “attack” by OSPAD-2D are usually correctly classified.
Therefore, OSPAD-fusion employs a cascaded fusion algo-
rithm to combine the strengths of both algorithms. The per-
formance, as evaluated on NDCLD’15 and NDIris3D, sur-
passes all other available open source iris PAD methods.
4.2 Deep Learning-Based Methods
With the rise in popularity of deep learning, it may come
as no surprise that the field of iris PAD has followed that
trend. There are multiple forms this application of deep
learning may take. Proposed methodologies range from
full end-to-end deep learning-based classification where the
input is a raw or pre-processed image and the output is a
PAD score or decision. Researchers have also shown that
deep learning-based identity recognition models can be em-
ployed as feature extractors for iris PAD images. Finally, re-
searchers have shown the power of adversarial networks in
PAD. By training GANs to generate near-perfect synthetic
iris images, the discriminator can be used to distinguish be-
tween bona fide samples and presentation attacks.
The challenges that arise when using deep learning sur-
round generalizability. Can we train models on one domain
and expect it to perform reliably on another unseen domain?
Deep learning has been shown to perform well when both
training and testing data are from the same source(s). How-
ever, PAD has the property that we cannot predict what fu-
ture attacks will look like, hence, methods need to be robust
across domains.
4.2.1 End-To-End CNNs
[21] show how an ensemble of neural networks can be em-
ployed to transform BSIF representations of images into
more discriminative features which enable the network to
make stronger inferences. Predictions from the individual
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networks in the ensemble are then aggregated to output a de-
cision. The cross-domain ability of this approach is shown
and results that outperform the state-of-the-art are reported.
[39] propose a new PAD architecture DensePAD which uti-
lizes the popular CNN architecture DenseNet. This pro-
posed architecture takes normalized iris images of size
120 × 160 as input and outputs a decision as to whether
the sample is bona fide or attack. Their paper addresses tex-
tured contact lenses in an uncontrolled and cross-sensor sce-
nario, and presents good results on unseen types of textured
contacts. Good cross-dataset and cross-attack performance
can also be seen in [15, 14]. In [14] a CNN is employed
to perform classification on patches of an iris region. The
results suggest that textured contact lenses are the most dif-
ficult presentation attack to classify. This is later extended
to [15] which includes the ocular region. In that work, three
CNNs are fused to generate decisions. Through analyzing
the ocular region in conjunction with the iris, additional in-
formation can be attained that aids classification and strong
cross-dataset performance is detailed.
[3] investigated whether information in the IrisCode ([9])
can be useful for PAD. Three inputs are considered in this
work as input to three CNNs. Un-normalized irises are
found to allow more accurate detection, suggesting that live-
ness information may be lost during normalization. Tex-
tured contact lenses are again found to be more difficult to
detect in comparison to paper printouts. The reason for this
may be that the printed pattern is visible on the entire sam-
ple whereas the textured contact is only visible on the iris.
[32] employ a fine-tuned VGG-16 architecture to propose
a method of iris PAD to detect post-mortem samples. This
approach also provides analysis as to what features and re-
gions the network deems most relevant to PAD classifica-
tion by presenting the class activation maps. Results show
a strong ability to detect post-mortem iris samples, but no
cross-attack analysis is reported.
4.2.2 Employing CNNs As Feature Extractors
[26] show how the combination of CNN based features
for both global and local iris regions can result in more
discriminative feature representations. To generate scores,
SVMs are employed. This work explores feature-level fu-
sion where the features are concatenated and passed to the
SVM, as well as score-level fusion, where individual re-
gions are passed to an SVM and then based on these scores
another SVM is used to make the final decision. Various
input types are also examined: three-channel gray images,
three-channel Retinex images, and the fusion of both pre-
vious types into a third three-channel combination. The re-
sults show that this approach of feature extraction produced
better results than using an end-to-end CNN and better re-
sults than all compared previous works. This method also
shows resilience against unseen attack samples by present-
ing results on databases from the LivDet-Iris-2017 compe-
tition.
4.2.3 Adversarial Learning
Multiple modern approaches employed GANs for iris PAD.
The logic for this is that if a discriminator network can be
trained to accurately decide whether a synthetic sample is
bona fide or not, then the same discriminator may be able
to detect presentation attack samples that may exhibit non-
natural artifacts such as a patterned iris or paper texture.
[41] hypothesized that these discriminator networks will
generate a tight boundary around bona fide iris samples,
such that any attack samples will fall outside this boundary.
RaSGAN ([16]) is employed as the synthetic iris generator.
The results show that the generated synthetic iris images
are very similar to bona fide irises. This work is extended
in [40]. The relativistic discriminator is re-purposed for iris
PAD. This one-class approach is outperformed by the com-
pared approaches on previously seen attacks. However, re-
sults show that fine-tuning this discriminator network with
a small number of presentation attack samples outperforms
other methods on unseen attack types and hence has high
generalizability.
[13] also proposed the use of GANs to attain better gen-
eralization in iris PAD. The proposed methodology outlined
that learning latent representations of images that are invari-
ant to the presentation attack type yet still preserve infor-
mation necessary to make the classification results in robust
generalization against different attack types. However, the
dataset used in this work is small and may not be represen-
tative of the individual domains. Their work concludes that
the presented results outline that deep learning approaches
with additional strategies will provide great development in
iris PAD.
4.3 Hybrid Methods
[38] combine the Haralick texture features in the multi-
level Redundant Discrete Wavelet Transform (RDWT) do-
main with VGG features reduced by principal component
anaysis. The two types of features are concatenated to-
gether as the input to a 3-layer MLP for binary classifica-
tion as bona fide or attack. Experiments on the combined
iris dataset proposed in [19] show that the proposed fu-
sion method outperforms Haralick features or VGG features
alone. The method also achieves better results than several
baselines including LBP, WLBP, and DESIST.
Building upon six traditional features (BSIF, LBP, CoA-
LBP [27], HoG, DAISY [31], and SID) and one deep fea-
ture extracted by the first seven layers of VGG, [29] propose
to learn the best subset of features through group sparsity.
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Group Dropout is used to avoid excessive reliance on cer-
tain features and a novel group sparsity-based regularization
strategy is adopted to mitigate overfitting. The authors eval-
uate the proposed method on NDCLD’13, IIITD (Cogent
and Vista), and Clarkson LivDet-Iris 2013 datasets. On ND-
CLD’13 and IIITD, the method outperforms the state-of-
the-art method. On Clarkson LivDet-Iris 2013, the method
outperforms the winner of the competition.
[5] performs a score-level fusion of data-driven features
learned from a customized Densenet121 architecture and
the same set of handcrafted features as in [29]. The score-
level fusion is guided by a Friedman test which identi-
fies the top k-features to include in the fusion. The au-
thors accommodated a wide range of experimental setups
including intra-sensor, inter-sensor, and combined-sensor
tests and with both textured and soft contact lens, on sev-
eral benchmark datasets: NDCLD’13, IIITD (Cogent and
Vista), Clarkson Livdet 2017. The method further outper-
forms [29] and all previous state-of-the-art method in al-
most all experiments.
5 Performance of Methods
This section summarizes the performance comparison of
the PAD methods covered in this paper. We observe that
most methods differ in datasets, train/test splits, and eval-
uation metrics. Therefore, we adopt the following strategy
when comparing their performance: for methods that do not
have source codes available, we group them by the datasets
and train/test split used and report the results as in the orig-
inal papers. For open source methods, we attempt to com-
pare all methods whose source codes can be obtained from
the internet or through contacting the authors.
5.1 Comparison of methods grouped by datasets
In [23], the authors compared five different PAD meth-
ods on four different datasets whose PAIs include printouts
and patterned contact lenses. All five methods are tradi-
tional vision-based methods, where the feature extractors
are adopted from previous PAD papers. Through extensive
experiments, the authors discovered that the fusion of tex-
ture (BSIF) and image quality (BRISQUE) leads to the best
performance for unknown attacks. In contrast, when all at-
tacks and sensors are included in the development of the
PAD algorithm, color adaptive quantized patterns (CAQP)
achieves the best performance. Furthermore, the experi-
ments in the paper demonstrate that the fusion of multiple
high performing features generally leads to higher accuracy.
In [5], the authors compared their method against [29]
and [38] on a wide range of datasets: NDCLD’13, IIITD
(Cogent and Vista), Clarkson Livdet 2017. Both intra-
dataset and cross-dataset experiments are performed. [5]
ranked first in most cross-dataset scenarios and achieved
low error rates in intra-dataset settings as well. The method
proposed by [29] is the next best aproach with consistent
performance across settings. [38] achieve near-perfect per-
formance on NDCLD’13 intra-dataset test, but perform less
well on other datasets and always ranked last in cross-
dataset settings, indicating its inability to generalize well
to unknown types of attacks.
Other methods available for comparison are those from
the same family of work. [39] compared against [38] and
achieved better results. [15] showed improved performance
over [14] on the same datasets. In those cases, however, no
comparisons with other methods are offered. For other pa-
pers, either no performance comparisons are provided or
different train/test split are used for reporting the perfor-
mance. This makes it challenging for the community to
compare methods when multiple papers claim to achieve
state-of-the-art results.
5.2 Comparison of Open Source Methods
The only comprehensive comparison of open source
methods known to us is [12]. To the best of our knowledge,
no new open source methods have been released since that
paper. Three modern publications in this paper, [24, 7, 12],
along with three older ones are included in the comparison
using the same protocol. The authors found that the PAD
method based on photometric stereo features [7] generalize
better to attacks of contact lens of unknown textures, while
the BSIF texture-based PAD method [24] performs better
in closed-set scenarios. Experiments also show that the fu-
sion method [12] outperforms the other two methods in both
known and unknown settings. This finding agrees with [23].
6 Future Research Directions
Standardized evaluation platform [6] reported in 2018
that the only available iris PAD evaluation platform is the
LivDet-Iris series, and there were no platforms for asyn-
chronous evaluation of iris PAD algorithms. To the best of
our knowledge, we still do not have such a platform. As
observed in Section 5, fair comparison between methods,
especially those without source codes, is still very chal-
lenging. A standardized, accessible, and fair platform for
PAD evaluation will facilitate the comparison between PAD
methods.
Fairness in iris PAD [11] study gender bias in iris PAD.
Three different experimental classifiers are examined and
for all three it shows that the error rates for males are lower
than for females. To our knowledge, this is the first work
examining demographic bias in PAD, for any modality. The
authors note possible future extensions to examining bias in
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eye color. There could also be room to investigate the accu-
racy of iris PAD across race. There has been much work on
bias in facial recognition systems such as in [1]. Although
considerably less demographic information is available in
an iris sample, it would still be a worthwhile endeavor to in-
vestigate biases, seeing as [11] concluded that females seem
to be significantly less protected by iris PAD systems.
Making methods Open Source [12] lists six iris PAD
methods that were either publicly available or available by
contacting the authors. The field would benefit from more
methods becoming open source, so that proposed method-
ologies can be easily benchmarked against the current state-
of-the-art. Open-sourcing your code also furthers repro-
ducibility, enabling researchers to make modifications and
improvements directly rather than having to reimplement
methods based on published descriptions, thus decreasing
the time required to run experiments.
Generalization to unknown attack types The ability to
be robust to unseen attack types is crucially important. At-
tackers are continually developing new attack methodolo-
gies to circumvent iris PAD systems. In the future, the main
goal of iris PAD should be the ability to detect unseen attack
types while maintaining high accuracy on known attacks. In
the work by [41], a tight boundary around bona fide samples
is generated using a GAN. It showed increased accuracy
against unseen attacks; however, the compared work outper-
formed the GAN approach on known attacks. It seems from
previous works that it is a trade-off between exceptional
performance on known attacks but poorer performance on
unseen attacks, or good performance on unseen attacks but
worse performance on known attacks. One possible future
direction could be trying to bridge the gap between known
attacks and unseen attacks. Is there a way to more precisely
model bona fide irises such that attack samples can be easily
distinguishable?
7 Summary
This paper summarizes recent advancements in iris PAD
since the release of [6]. New publicly available datasets are
outlined and described. We show that modern methodolo-
gies can be grouped into one of three sets: traditional hand-
crafted feature extraction and classification, deep learning-
based approaches, and hybrid approaches that use both tra-
ditional and deep-learning in conjunction. Commentary is
provided on the performance of the studied methods in com-
parison to one another. Finally, possible future research di-
rections are given to help inspire new works.
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